Foreign Direct Investment in Hungary: Why the Slowdown? by Amato, Jacquelyn M.
Lehigh University
Lehigh Preserve
Transformation in post-communist Hungary Perspectives on Business and Economics
1-1-2006
Foreign Direct Investment in Hungary: Why the
Slowdown?
Jacquelyn M. Amato
Lehigh University
Follow this and additional works at: http://preserve.lehigh.edu/perspectives-v24
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Perspectives on Business and Economics at Lehigh Preserve. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Transformation in post-communist Hungary by an authorized administrator of Lehigh Preserve. For more information, please contact
preserve@lehigh.edu.
Recommended Citation
Amato, Jacquelyn M., "Foreign Direct Investment in Hungary: Why the Slowdown?" (2006). Transformation in post-communist
Hungary. Paper 12.
http://preserve.lehigh.edu/perspectives-v24/12
111
FOREIGN DIRECT 
INVESTMENT IN HUNGARY: 
WHY THE SLOWDOWN?
Jacquelyn M. Amato
Introduction
Investment by businesses abroad, foreign
direct investment (FDI), is widely regarded as
the responsible force behind many of Hungary’s
successful economic policies because it brings
in working capital that might otherwise be
unattainable. FDI has injected approximately
$55.4 billion into the Hungarian economy since
1989, including more than $15.2 billion from
the United States. Foreign investment helps
modernize Hungary’s industrial sector and
introduces thousands of new jobs. Foreign
companies currently account for over 70 per-
cent of Hungary’s exports, 33 percent of its
GDP, and approximately 25 percent of new jobs.
(“Background Note: Hungary”) 
Beginning in 1995, Hungary had enjoyed
an average annual FDI inflow of $3.9 billion,
which continued steadily until 2002 when it
dropped to $1.7 billion. In 2002 the inflow of
capital from FDI slowed so much that by 2003
it had become a net outflow of $500 million
(“Cooling Down”), indicating that disinvestment
outweighed new investment. (Schweizer, “Losing
Its Edge”) This decline in FDI poses a significant
threat to the Hungarian economy, which relies
heavily on this form of foreign capital. 
In this article, I explore the various factors
behind the deceleration of this significant
source of income. I first investigate how
Hungary’s growing debt has been reinforcing
foreign investors’ loss of confidence in the
Hungarian economy through missed govern-
ment budget deficit targets. I then turn to
Hungary’s recent European Union (EU) mem-
bership and its effects on Hungary’s investment
relationships with its largest partners. Lastly, I
examine the repercussions of Hungary’s recent
wage increases on FDI inflow. 
     
High Debt Battles Internal
Investment
Growing Debt: A Growing Concern
The first significant factor responsible for
the recent downward trend in foreign direct
investment in Hungary results from the gov-
ernment’s credibility. Not only does Hungary’s
large budget deficit hinder its reputation as a
stable and affluent economy in which to invest,
but it also reduces investors’ confidence in
Hungary’s ability to control it. 
In 2004 Hungary was forced to delay
entrance into the Euro Zone by two years to
2010, but critics continue to insist that
Hungary’s deficit remains too large (it is the
highest in the EU). Also, its revised annual tar-
gets are too high for compliance with the con-
ditions of euro membership to be accomplished
in time. According to the convergence criteria
outlined in the Growth and Stability Pact of the
Maastricht Treaty, before joining the Euro Zone
a country must first reduce its budget deficit to
a level below three percent of GDP for at least
two years. Also, its public debt must not exceed
60 percent of its GDP. (“Specifications on the
Implementation…,” p. 3) 
Hungary has overshot its targeted budget
deficit for four consecutive years since 2002, as
Figure 1 indicates. The year 2002 marked the
largest spread between the intended and the
actual budget deficits. The government had
resolved to reduce the deficit to 2.9 percent of
GDP, a realistic goal had the deficit actually
been declining. Unfortunately, 2002 ended with
a deficit more than three times the size of the
intended figure, at 9.3 percent of GDP. Although
the gap between the government’s targeted and
actual budget deficit has since been reduced,
the difference remains noteworthy. In addition,
the figures for the future do not look promis-
ing, with a deficit possibly amounting to 
6.7 percent of GDP in 2006, and perhaps even
reaching 7.0 percent in 2007. Concerns about
the 2010 adoption of the euro by Hungary con-
tinue to grow as forecasts of the government
budget deficit remain consistently above the
three-percent ceiling, a level that would need
to be reached by 2008. (Blahó) 
Although the primary unease with this
large budget deficit lies in its persistence well
beyond the euro limit, concerns are deepened
by the continued overshooting of the deficit
beyond even the revised, less-stringent govern-
ment targets. Hungary’s finance minister, Tibor
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Figure 1
Missed Budget Deficit Targets, Hungary
Figure created from data in Blahó and “Economist Intelligence… .”
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Draskovics, has tried to alleviate concern by
comparing Hungary’s deficit figures with those
of its similarly sized neighbor, the Czech
Republic, claiming that Hungary’s 2004 deficit
resembles that of the Czech Republic’s deficit
from the previous year. However, the difference
lies in the fact that the Czech Republic did not
overshoot its government expectations by as
large an amount. (Schweizer, “Still Missing
Targets”) 
One source of difficulty is the govern-
ment’s recent commitment to cutting taxes.
Although this is a welcome policy among tax-
payers, it may not be prudent to reduce tax rev-
enues when the budget deficit is as far above
the three-percent threshold as it is. In addition,
more spending on infrastructure is needed,
although this often entails expensive projects.
(I will discuss this later in the article.) Hungary
seems too eager to prove to its investors that it
can reduce its budget deficit by setting low
annual targets, when in reality Hungary is
destroying credibility in its ability to control its
deficit at all. Hungary needs to be more realis-
tic with its future government targets, even if
that means a more gradual and conservative
approach to reducing its deficit, as has been the
case in the Czech Republic. Even though the
Czech Republic’s deficit is within the same
range as Hungary’s, FDI in the Czech Republic
has recently surpassed that of its neighbors —
Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria. In 2004, the
Czech Republic received more than one billion
euros ($1.2 billion) more in FDI than Hungary.
Moreover, Bank Austria Creditanstalt, the
largest international banking network in
Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), forecasts
that the Czech Republic will remain more than
two billion euros ($2.4 billion) ahead of
Hungary with respect to FDI in 2006. (“Foreign
Direct Investment…”) Such a shift in primary
destinations of FDI is a signal that missing tar-
gets strongly discourages investors, who often
seek politically and financially stable economies
in which to invest. (Jenei) 
Adding to Hungary’s daunting deficit
problems is a series of recent credit downgrades
that it has suffered. In July 2003 Fitch Ratings,
an international rating agency, placed
Hungary’s long-term foreign currency rating of
A– and its long-term local currency rating of
A+ in the “negative outlook” category, signal-
ing the risks of the government budget deficit
exceeding its projections and the consequent
damaging effects on its public finances and
macroeconomic balance. (Parker, p. 12) After
Hungary failed to show much improvement, in
January 2005 Fitch downgraded its long-term,
local currency rating one notch from A+ to A
for failing to meet budget deficit targets. By the
end of that same year, Hungary experienced yet
another downgrade. This time Fitch down-
graded both Hungary’s long-term local and for-
eign currency ratings another notch, from A–
to BBB+ and from A to A–, respectively, with a
“negative outlook” comment attached to the
foreign currency rating. Fitch determined that,
with Hungary having overshot its government
deficit targets for four consecutive years,
“Public finances are now on an unsustainable
path… and the government’s track record
doesn’t transpire a great deal of confidence.”
(“Fitch Downgrades Hungary”) Fitch is also
pessimistic about Hungary adopting the euro
as early as 2010, predicting instead that it will
not be able to meet the Maastricht criteria for
adoption until 2014. (“Fitch Downgrades
Hungary”) The recent history of the Fitch cur-
rency ratings for Hungary can be viewed in
Table 1.
With both currency and country risks now
considered higher, this most recent investment
downgrade is certain to affect Hungary’s abili-
ty to attract future investors. The decline of
Hungary’s foreign currency rating to BBB+ may
be particularly detrimental as Hungary’s rating
has not been in the B category since 2000. The
same day as the latest 2005 downgrade, the
Hungarian forint depreciated on the interbank
foreign exchange market to an 18-month low.
(“Minutes…,” p. 2) As explained by Orsolya
Nyests, an analyst at Erste Bank, the largest
retail network in central Europe, this indicates
that “while financial markets typically pay lit-
tle attention to government GDP or inflation
projections, recent overshoots of the country’s
budget deficit have caused some concern
among investors.” (Schweizer, “Still Missing
Targets”) 
After its fourth consecutive year of missed
deficit targets, investor confidence in the
Hungarian economy has been weakened if not
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scarred. Hungary must resolve its large deficit
issues, but hurried unrealistic government pro-
jections are not the solution, especially since,
according to Fitch, “the current [budget] deficit
is just too big to tackle in one electoral cycle.”
(“Fitch Downgrades Hungary”) Unfortunately,
other obstacles and trade-offs also prevent
Hungary from being successful in its quest to
reduce its large deficit. Hungary thus finds itself
in a dilemma. On the one hand, it seeks to mar-
ket itself as an attractive business investment,
which requires government funds dedicated to
developing and advancing physical infrastruc-
ture as well as offering enticing investment
incentive. On the other hand, it is simultane-
ously trying to lower the large budget deficit,
which necessitates reduced or perhaps even
austere government spending, to adopt the euro
in time. 
Hungary’s Infrastructure: Reforms
Needed to Re-Attract FDI
Developing Hungary’s transportation and
telecommunication infrastructure is an impor-
tant facilitator of FDI, because it connects peo-
ple, businesses, universities, and bordering
countries. Quality long-distance transportation
(mainly roads and railroads) is significant to
investors because they link the developing
regions of a country to the faster growing areas.
Further, short-distance transportation facili-
tates commuting, which strengthens local labor
markets and helps reduce unemployment.
(“Economic Survey — Hungary 2004…”)
Vilmos Skultéti, CEO of the Hungarian
Investment and Trade Promotion Agency
(ITDH), contends that, from the very moment
that the first motorway was constructed from
Budapest to Central Hungary in the late 1990s,
foreign investors started to show interest.
(Skultéti) Advanced and high-speed forms of
transportation and telecommunication attract
investors because they provide conditions under
which businesses thrive, as will be discussed
below. Therefore, as Hungary’s competitors are
adopting more developed transportation and
telecommunication systems, Hungary must be
careful not to fall behind. 
As a leading recipient of FDI that flows
into the Eastern European region, the Czech
Republic is a serious competitor to Hungary as
a prime FDI destination. Among other advan-
tages, the Czech Republic’s railway transporta-
tion system is often regarded as one of the most
advanced in the region, whereas Hungary’s rail-
way system is inefficient and outdated. Only a
fraction (2,200 kilometers) of the 7,900 kilo-
meters of Hungarian rail tracks run electrical-
ly, and the demand for faster trains continues
to grow. (Konrad) Electrically run rail lines
offer faster acceleration and greater efficiency
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Table 1
Hungary Sovereign Rating History
Date Long-Term Currency Rating Outlook/Watch
Foreign Currency (FC) Local Currency (LC)
Dec. 2005 BBB+ A– FC negative, LC stable
Jan. 2005 A– A FC negative, LC stable
Jul. 2003 A– A+ negative
Nov. 2000 A– A+ stable
Sep. 2000 BBB+ A positive
Oct. 1999 BBB+ A –
Jul. 1998 BBB A –
Jun. 1997 BBB A– –
May 1997 BBB– BBB+ Rating Watch positive
Apr. 1996 BBB– BBB+ –
Table created from data in “Fitch — Complete Sovereign Rating History,” p. 3.
      
in service. A lag in railway development is just
one example of Hungary’s need to invest in its
transportation system in order to compete with
its neighbors for FDI. Unfortunately, Hungary
must also take into account its budget deficit
when proposing new development projects. For
instance, the recent downward pressure on the
deficit has already hindered a 2.3-billion-euro
plan to improve Hungary roadways. (Konrad)
In addition to the Czech Republic,
Hungary also competes with Ireland in attract-
ing FDI. Similarly sized (both countries are
about the size of the state of Indiana), Ireland’s
rapid economic growth can be largely attrib-
uted to its FDI boom during the 1990s. Ireland
continues to enjoy a generous FDI inflow par-
tially due to its advanced systems of trans-
portation and telecommunication. (Morrow, 
p. 113) Ireland has three major airports with
easy access to international markets, advanced
motorways (almost 96,000 kilometers of total
roadways, all paved) and railways (approxi-
mately 3,000 km) that connect all major cities
and ports in Ireland. Ireland also provides easy-
access shipping methods in addition to one of
the most sophisticated telecommunication
infrastructures in all of Europe. (“Doing
Business and Investing in Ireland,” p. 13) 
On the other hand, Hungary supports but
one international airport with just two termi-
nals and only one Hungarian airline company,
Malév. Hungary is connected by a road network
of 70,000 paved kilometers, which is less than
73 percent of Ireland’s road network. (“Public
Transportation”) In addition, seven of the eight
major motorways convene in Budapest and con-
nect much less of the country than does
Ireland’s roadway system, which connects var-
ious major cities such as Dublin, Galway, and
Shannon at opposite ends of the country.  With
exports accounting for almost three-fourths of
Hungarian GDP, improving transportation
modes, particularly roadways, to the level seen
in Ireland can largely enhance investors’ attrac-
tion to Hungary. 
Telecommunication infrastructure is the
other half of the two-part recipe for a country’s
infrastructure investment. Though many facets
of its developing economy are still in a transi-
tion stage, Hungary has been fortunate in its
telecommunication technology, mostly because
90 percent of Hungary’s telecommunication
sector is privatized and foreign-owned. (“2005
Investment Climate…”) Regardless, Hungary’s
telecommunication network has failed to
advance to the levels of the original 15 EU coun-
tries (the EU-15). Again, Ireland can be used as
a good comparison. In 2004 Hungary had 355
main telephone lines in use per 1,000 people,
whereas the number of main telephone lines in
use in Ireland was 505 per 1,000 people. In addi-
tion, cellular telephone usage and internet
access are increasingly becoming key compo-
nents of a well-developed telecommunication
network. In 2004, Hungary had 870 mobile sub-
scribers per 1,000 people, which was still sur-
passed by Ireland’s 945 subscribers per 1,000
people. As of 2005, Ireland had 515 internet
users and 60 internet hosts per 1,000 people,
while Hungary had only 305 internet users and
26 internet hosts per 1,000 people. (“The World
Factbook: Hungary”; “The World Factbook:
Ireland”) Ireland’s infrastructure might serve
as a benchmark as Hungary continues to
improve its transportation and telecommuni-
cation systems. 
The “new” EU members (the EU-10) often
look to Ireland as a noteworthy example of the
achievements that these ten EU nations would
like to emulate. After all, Ireland has trans-
formed itself from one of the poorest EU mem-
bers to one of the richest. However, Ireland
enjoyed the assistance of $15 billion in struc-
tural funds from the EU, which the EU has
already proclaimed will not be available to the
new members. Instead, the EU has offered only
$12 billion in structural funds to be shared 
by all of the EU-10 over three years. (Wood)
Therefore, Hungary needs to find a balance
between meeting future budget deficit targets
and investing in its infrastructure to strength-
en its competitive edge. The planned spending
on infrastructure for 2006 would raise
Hungary’s budget deficit by almost a full per-
centage point, from eight percent of GDP to
nine percent (if motorway spending is includ-
ed in the budget). (“Interfax Hungary
Business…”) 
Looking forward, if Hungary can adopt the
euro on time, it can mean numerous benefits.
First, maintaining a separate currency can be
expensive. Adopting the euro would enable
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Hungary to save on monetary-policy-making
personnel, currency printing, and other serv-
ices affiliated with sustaining an individual cur-
rency. Secondly, entering the Euro Zone will
reduce speculative risk (especially that which
affects a small open economy such as Hungary)
from investors and currency rating agencies
simply by becoming a member of a well-
respected, stable single-currency area. (“Flights
to Frankfurt”) Fitch predicts that adoption of
the euro would improve Hungary’s long-term
foreign currency ratings by 2–3 grades. (Parker,
p. 17)
Has EU Membership Helped or Hurt
Hungary’s FDI Status?
Hungary’s problem of falling FDI is not
only attributable to the difficulties it faces in
tackling its enormous budget deficit, but also
to its recent EU accession. When Hungary
applied for membership in the EU in 1994
(Konrád and Vándor, p. 8), Hungary had per-
ceived EU association as a way to establish
investor confidence and increase trade as well
as GDP. For example, fDi Magazine of the
Financial Times group predicted that EU entry
would mean simplified cross-border movement
that would enable easy access to 600 million
potential consumers. (“Hungary”) Further,
Hungary’s Investment and Trade Development
Agency (ITD) proclaimed that EU membership
would help Hungary to stimulate domestic
demand through a customs-free international
market, enhance FDI inflow via greater busi-
ness confidence, and improve its GDP growth
with higher export sales and demand through
the EU market. (“Benefits of EU Membership,”
p. 1) 
By 2001 Hungary was absorbing one-third
of all of the FDI flowing into Central and
Eastern European countries, and 60 percent of
its economy was being powered by its export
sector. In addition, 75 percent of this export
market was EU-driven. (“Hungary Country
Commercial…”) Seventy percent of Hungary’s
export businesses were foreign-owned, which
generated 33 percent of its GDP. The United
States owned 29 percent of these companies,
and Germany owned another 26 percent.
(“Hungary Country Commercial…”) German
and United States companies alone were
responsible for roughly 20 percent of Hungary’s
GDP in 2001. Once Hungary joined the EU, it
assumed that its membership would attract new
foreign investors in addition to increasing its
FDI from two of its largest investment sources,
Germany and the United States. 
German FDI in Hungary and 
the Effects of the EU Monetary
Policy System 
In 2001 Hungary pegged its domestic cur-
rency, the forint (HUF), to the euro. In doing
so, Hungary essentially aligned its currency to
the German economy, Germany being one of
the largest European economies upon which
the monetary policy of the euro area is based.
Unfortunately, by 2002 the German economy
decelerated. (“The World Factbook: Germany”)
From 2002 to 2003 and again in 2005,
Germany’s GDP grew by less than one percent.
In addition, Germany’s rising unemployment
rate reached a record level in 2005 of 12.6 per-
cent. (“German Jobless Rate…”) Coupled with
an extremely low inflation rate, which was 1.8
percent in June of 2005 with a core inflation
rate of only 0.5 percent, Germany’s economy
has been slow to grow and thus disinclined to
invest in Hungary. (“Report to Congress…,” 
p. 13) 
Furthermore, the best monetary policy for
Germany’s situation would be to lower interest
rates to stimulate investment and raise GDP,
which would in turn create jobs and reduce
unemployment. However, in adopting the euro
Germany relinquished control of its monetary
authority. Unfortunately, the European Central
Bank (ECB), the central bank for the Euro
Zone, is an inflation-targeting central bank. As
such, it ignores unemployment when setting
interest rates. (“Inflation: The 2% Solution”)
The fact that the German inflation rate is below
the EU average implies that the ECB sees no
need to adjust interest rates to stimulate
Germany’s GDP growth. This leaves the
German economy in a relatively stagnant state,
which continues to affect its investment deci-
sions in Hungary (Figure 2).
Clearly, the health of the German econo-
my strongly determines the level of Hungary’s
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FDI. Looking at patterns in United States FDI
in Hungary further illustrates the importance
of German FDI to the Hungarian total. United
States’ businesses are responsible for almost
one-third of Hungary’s FDI and have continued
to invest in Hungary at an increasing rate since
2000 (Table 2). Despite this rising trend in U.S.
investment, total FDI in Hungary has fallen
since 2002, which is the year when German
GDP as well as German FDI in Hungary began
to fall. This illustrates that Germany greatly
influences changes in FDI volume. 
Effects of a Minimum Wage Increase
during the FDI Decrease
FDI has further dwindled as a result of
recent wage increases in Hungary. In 2001, the
minimum wage in Hungary was hiked 57 per-
cent and was followed by another 25 percent
increase just one year later. The statutory min-
imum wage is currently (as of January 1, 2006)
HUF 62,500 (about 250 euros) per month,
which affects a relatively substantial proportion
of employees (eight percent of employees in
Hungary earn the minimum wage as opposed
to 1.4 percent in the United States in 2004).
(“Statutory Minimum Wages…,” p. 1) These
large increases are unprecedented in any 
other OECD country (“National Tripartite
Agreement…”) and unfortunately occurred at
the same time as Hungary’s inflow of foreign
investment started to slow. Potential investors
have begun to bypass Hungary and take advan-
tage of the lower wages of Hungary’s neighbors,
Slovakia, Romania, and Ukraine, and even Asian
countries, such as China. (Schweizer, “Losing
Its Edge”) In addition, already-established
investors on the outskirts of Hungary have
started employing cheaper labor from outside
its borders. The minimum wage in Slovakia, for
instance, is about $1.36 an hour, which is
almost 30 percent less than in Hungary (at
$1.88 an hour). Adding to the competition is
Romania with a minimum wage of $0.73 an
hour and Ukraine, with a minimum wage of just
$0.45 an hour. (“Pay in Europe 2006…”)
Hyundai, a South Korean carmaker, for
instance, has already ruled out Hungary as too
expensive in its decision concerning where to
build a new plant for 2007. (“Cooling Down”)
Peugeot Citroën, the French carmaker, has also
refused to locate an assembly plant in Hungary,
opting to build in Slovakia instead. Other for-
eign companies have actually started to move
out of Hungary. For example, IBM closed one
of its manufacturing facilities in Hungary due
to high labor costs and moved it to China
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Figure 2
German FDI in Hungary vs. German GDP Growth
Figure created from data in International Monetary Fund and “EU Direct Investment Flows… .”
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(Schweizer, “Losing Its Edge”), where wages are
as low as $0.30 an hour. (Sundquist) 
As investors have moved elsewhere, so too
have thousands of jobs. For instance, the IBM
plant that left Hungary to seek cheaper labor
had employed 3,700 workers. (Ghanta) Since
cheap labor is no longer Hungary’s forte,
Hungary must adjust its strategy for attracting
FDI. 
Recommendations and Conclusions
FDI has been Hungary’s leading force in
propelling it from a communist country to a
CEE leader in attracting foreign businesses.
However, as Hungary’s economy has developed,
so too has the competition for FDI. No longer
can Hungary rely simply on cheap labor to
attract investors. More complex issues must be
addressed in order to ensure a future inflow of
FDI. Reducing its budget deficit by keeping it
aligned with its government targets is the most
significant change that Hungary can achieve in
order to regain its credibility and investment
grade abroad. Enforcing policies of austere 
government spending and continued taxation
can make adopting the euro in 2010 a reality.
Being a part of the Euro Zone will automati-
cally boost its credit rating, at which point 
FDI inflow into Hungary should rise again. This
will in turn increase Hungary’s revenue and
enable it to allocate more funds towards advanc-
ing its transportation and telecommunication
systems. 
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Table 2
U.S. and German FDI in Hungary (in Millions of U.S. $)
U.S. FDI German FDI
1999 1.408 0.955
2000 1.000 1.476
2001 2.000 -0.528
2002 2.500 -1.341
2003 2.824 -0.582
2004 3.285 0.818
Table created from data in “EU Direct Investment Flows…”; “Foreign Trade Barriers: Hungary”; and 
“Hungary & the United States.”
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